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ABSTRAK 
Pada FPU (Floating Production Unit) terdapat sumber 
berbahaya yaitu kondensat. Kondensate dapat menjadi 
berbahaya kepada awak kapal yang tinggal di kapal. Kondensat 
diletakan dan di proses di lepas pantai dapat memicu terjadinya 
kebakaran pada kapal FPU. Pada dasarnya terdapat kesempatan 
dari kondensat maupun kemungkinan yang lain yang dapat 
memicu terjadinya kebakaran pada kapal FPU. Pada kapal 
terdapat awak kapaldari FPU untuk mengatur kerja proses 
hidrokarbon dan pemindahan kondensat dan gas dari FPU ke 
ORF (Onshore Receiving Facilities). Hidrokarbon di dalam 
FPU diterima dari sumur minyak bawah laut yang disalurkan 
ke FPU, yang nantinya di terima dan di proses di FPU yang 
nantinya digunakan untuk bahan bakar. Kemungkinan 
terjadinya kecelakaan pada kapal FPU adalah besar, dan salah 
satu kemungkinannya adalah kebakaran. Api sendiri bisa 
terjadi dikarenakan banyak macam – macam penyebab. Api 
bisa terjadi dikarenakan listrik, oli, panas, dan penyebab 
lainnya. Pada kapal FPU seperti kondensat, bisa menjadi 
penyebab utama dari kebakaran. Pada dasarnya selain 
penyabab utama, oli juga dapat menjaadi penyebab tambahan 
bertambah besarnya kebakaran. Pada waktu itu terdapat 
kejadian kebakaran kapal FSO yang dimiliki oleh PT. CNOOC. 
 
 
 
 
Analisa resiko pada tugas akhir ini menggunakan metode 
HAZOP.pada evaluasi resiko menggunakan metode FTA untuk 
menghitung frekuensi, menggunnakan ALOHA untuk 
penempatan konsekuensi, dan menggunakan risk matix 
perusahaan ENI Indonesia. Terdapat banyak mode kesalahan 
pada proses kondensat system. Terdapat satu resiko yang tidak 
dapat diterima, yaitu resiko pada pipa bocor dari condensate 
exchanger ke MP separator bisa menyebabkan dampak 
kerusakan yang besarpada FPU, tetapi tidak terdapat korban 
jiwa. Tetapi pada risk matrix menunjukan pada level kuning. 
Setelah dimitigasi menggunakan LOPA dengan menambahkan 
indicator tekanan dan indicator suhu pada system. Semua mode 
resiko lainnya bisa menyebabkan bahaya dan menyebabkan 
kerugian di FPU, tetapi semua resiko lainnya dapat diterima. 
 
Kata kunci: FTA, HAZOP, LOPA, Penilaian Resiko 
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ABSTRACT 
On the FPU (Floating Production Unit) there is a 
dangerous congenital namely Condensate. The condensate 
could be a danger to the crew who stayed on the ship. The 
condensate is stored and process in offshore can be a trigger of 
fire at this FPU vessel. In addition there is a possibility of 
condensate or another possibility that can make a fire that 
occurred in this FPU vessel. On the ship there are crew of the 
FPU to handle the hydrocarbon process and transfer of 
condensate and gas from the FPU to the ORF. The hydrocarbon 
inside the FPU vessel derived from wells to FPU which will be 
retrieved and processed to be used as fuel in the process further. 
The possibility of accidents on FPU vessel is big, and one of 
big reason is fire. Fire itself can be caused by many variety of 
cause, it could happen because of electricity, oil, heat and other 
caused. At the FPU vessel like the condensate, can be a major 
cause of fires. In addition to being the main cause, the oil can 
also be a cause of the fire becomes larger. There is one fire 
accident that happen on FSO ship that belong to PT. CNOOC. 
Risk Assessment on this thesis using HAZOP method. For risk 
evaluation using FTA for the frequency, using ALOHA for the 
 
 
 
 
consequence plotting, and using ENI Risk Matrix for the 
consequence level. There are many failure mode on every 
system process of condensate process. There is one risk that 
unacceptable, the risk is when the pipe from the condensate 
exchanger to the MP separator leakage it can cause the major 
destruction of the FPU but there is no casualties, but on the risk 
matrix it shows that the failure mode on risk reduction measure 
level (yellow level). After The mitigation using LOPA the 
system add a pressure indicator and a temperature indicator to 
the system. All of the other risk that can cause hazard and make 
a local loss but all of it is acceptable. 
 
Keyword: FTA, HAZOP, LOPA, Risk Assessment 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Background  
 
On the FPU (Floating Production Unit) there is a dangerous 
congenital namely Condensate. The condensate could be a 
danger to the crew who stayed on the ship. The condensate is 
stored and process in offshore can be a trigger of fire at this 
FPU vessel. In addition there is a possibility of condensate or 
another possibility that can make a fire that occurred in this 
FPU vessel. On the ship there are crew of the FPU to handle 
the hydrocarbon process and transfer of condensate and gas 
from the FPU to the ORF. The hydrocarbon inside the FPU 
vessel derived from wells to FPU which will be retrieved and 
processed to be used as fuel in the process further. The 
possibility of accidents on FPU vessel is big, and one of big 
reason is fire. Fire itself can be caused by many variety of 
cause, it could happen because of electricity, oil, heat and other 
caused. At the FPU vessel like the condensate, can be a major 
cause of fires. In addition to being the main cause, the oil can 
also be a cause of the fire becomes larger. There is one fire 
accident that happen on FSO ship that belong to PT. CNOOC. 
 
There are two process at the FPU based on location, Hull 
Process and Topside Process. At the Topside Process there are 
many system happen such as, Production wells and fluid 
separation system, low temperature separation and gas 
compression system, flash gas compression system, condensate 
stabilization, storage, and export system, and etc. One of the 
system is Condensate storage system. Condensate storage 
system is a system for the condensate separation between the 
on spec condensate and off spec condensate.  
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The risk of fire on the condensate on spec and of spec tank is 
high. Every dangers and risks that posed can cause a fire 
because the condensate. The damage will happen on their 
equipment, economic losses and may harm to the people 
around it. From the existing problems, there are should be a 
study for the risks that can be posed, it aims to reduce or 
eliminate them since fire accident can cause a tremendous loss. 
 
1.2. Problem Formulation and Scope 
 
Condensate storage system is a system that consist of on-spec 
condensate storage system and off-spec condensate storage 
system. The flow of the condensate through the on-spec tank 
and the off-spec tank has a risk. One of the risk is fire risk. If 
the condensate flow or the temperature is going to be error it 
can be a fire. Therefore fire risk assessment on the storage 
condensate system at FPU are required to avoid fire accident 
that can harm to people around it. 
Based on the description above, presented several 
problems: 
1. How to analyze the risk that can possible inside the 
FPU vessel 
2. How to identify fire hazard that maybe occur in the 
FPU vessel 
3. How to minimalize the risk that occurred in FPU 
 
Scope of Problems: 
1. The ship as the object of this study is vessel that is 
FPU Jangkrik 
2. Evaluation of the risk is only at condensate storage 
system  
3. Analysis the off-spec condensate tank and on-spec 
condensate tank 
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4. The method used to identifiaction the risk is HAZOP 
method. 
 
1.3. Objective 
 
The objectives of this Thesis are: 
1. Identify the source of the fire in the ship and analyzing 
the risk  
2. Know the level of the risk that can be occurred 
3. Minimize the risk if cannot be tolerate 
 
1.4. Benefit 
 
The final results of this Thesis is the recommendations for the 
FPU Jangkrik to minimize the Fire Risk that can be occurred. 
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CHAPTER II       
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. FPU 
 
Floating Production Unit is a platform that works the same as 
FPU, split between crude oil with gas and water. FPU also does 
not have a permanent storages so that the results in the form of 
crude oil in the pump directly to the FSO or directly through a 
pipeline to an onshore. Inside the FPU there are two main 
process, topside process and hull process. 
2.2. Topside FPU Process 
 
The Floating Production Unit facilities are designed to 
continuously treat a maximum incoming production plateau of 
450 MMscfd, seen as a total result of both Jangkrik Main 
(plateau rate: 300MMscfd) and Jangkrik NE (plateau rate: 150 
MMscfd) production plus the maximum associated condensate 
(4100 SBPD) and produce water. Jangkrik Main is alson 
capable to produce 450MMscfd during Ramp-Up case. These 
450MMscfd are considered as the FPU nameplate capacity. 
The wells fluid arrives at FPU through 5 subsea Trunklines, 
with a provision for a connection of two additional trunklines 
in future phase. The mixed phase stream is distributed through 
two production manifolds and routed to two delicated slug 
catchers. From these receiving facilities the gas stream is sent 
to the gas section and liquid stream to a condensate collection 
header. 
Two different operating phases are identified. During phase 1 
the pressure at FPU battery limit for all Trunklines 945.7 barg 
6 
 
 
 
as per hydraulic calculation) is high enough to directly routed 
to the 3X50% Low temperature separation  
The Floating Production Unit facilities are designed to 
continuously treat a maximum incoming production plateau of 
450MMscfd, seen as a total result of both Jangkrik Main 
(plateau rate: 300MMscfd) and Jangkrik NE (plateau rate: 
150MMscfd) production plus the maximum associated 
condensate (4100 SBPD) and produced water. Jangkrik Main 
is also capable to produce 450MMscfd during Ramp-Up case. 
These 450MMscfd are considered as the FPU nameplate 
capacity. 
The wells fluid arrives at FPU through 5 subsea Trunklines, 
with a provision for a connection of two additional Trunklines 
in future phase. The mixed phase stream is distributed through 
two productions manifolds and routed to two dedicated slug 
catchers. From these receiving facilities the gas stream is sent 
to the Gas Section and liquid stream to a condensate collection 
header. 
The associated condensate collected in the slug catchers is, for 
its part, routed to the condensate stabilization train where it is 
mixed with condensates recovered from different locations in 
the process system (Booster Compressor KO drum, Low 
temperature separator, Flash Gas system, Fuel Gas System, 
Closed drain drum). During normal operation, the condensate 
is further let down in pressure and heated so as to pull out the 
flash gas and reach the export specification. The on-spec 
condensate stream is exported through a 4” pipeline under level 
control installed at the last step of the separation: LP separator. 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
2.1. Risk 
 
Risk is the combination of the likelihood and consequence of 
such accidents. More scientifically, it is defined as the 
probability of a specific adverse event occurring in a specific 
period or in specified circumstances. The likelihood may be 
expressed either as a frequency (i.e. the rate of events per unit 
time) or a probability (i.e. the chance of the event occurring in 
specified circumstances). The consequence is the degree of 
harm caused by the event. 
 
2.1.1. Risk Assessment 
 
Risk assessment is the whole process of risk analysis against 
technological and economic, social and political criteria. 
Hazard evaluation can be encouraged through a few formal 
strategies. These diverse strategies may contain comparative 
ways to deal with answer the fundamental danger evaluation 
questions; be that as it may, a few systems might be more fitting 
than others for danger examination relying upon the 
circumstance. 
Risk assessment techniques develop processes for identifying 
risk that can assist in decision making about the system. The 
logic of modeling the interaction of a system’s components can 
be divided into two general categories: induction and 
deduction. 
Fire Risk assessment in this bachelor Thesis has aim to 
determine the level of risk that can be generated in the FPU, by 
using Hazard Operability (HAZOP) method can be obtained 
the levels of risk, and using FTA to obtain the frequency. 
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2.2.1. HAZOP Method  
 
Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) use some keywords to 
identify the hazard from a system or process. Inside a process 
there are keyword such as (how, low no, etc.) used to know the 
deviation of system or process based on few parameters that 
has been set like pressure, temperature, flow, composition, etc. 
HAZOP methodology widely used to evaluate or identify 
hazard on system level with qualitative approach. Even though, 
quantitative approach often found and used for hazard 
identification and operation capability from a continue system 
or process (fluid or thermal process). For an example is system 
for distribution of oil using few pumps, tank, and few pipeline. 
This method is usually used for review a procedure and stages 
of operation of existing system. Table below show us Hazop 
method in ship. 
TABLE 
Step from Hazop method can be translate into this activity: 
1. Node selection 
2. The application of deviation that want to used 
3. Identify hazard cause associated with the guide word 
4. Identify all of the consequence that comes from a cause 
that did not depend on safeguards. 
5. Determination on the action that will eliminate or 
problem mitigation that has been identified if 
necessary. 
6. Repetition on all nodes. 
Inside identified hazard stages on HAZOP method on process 
engineering, then some terminology is often used. Here some 
terminology shown on table below: 
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Table 1 Basic Guide Words and Meaning 
Guide word Meaning 
NO OR NOT complete negation of the design intent 
MORE quantitative increase 
LESS quantitative decrease 
AS WELL AS qualitative modification/increase 
PART OF qualitative modification/decrease 
REVERSE logical opposite of the design intent 
OTHER THAN complete substitution 
 
Table 2 Guide Words Relating to Clock Time and Order and Sequence 
Guide word Meaning 
EARLY Relative to the clock time 
LATE Relative to the clock time 
BEFORE Relating to the order or sequence 
AFTER Relating to the order or sequence 
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Figure 1 Diagram of HAZOP method 
The step to get fulfil is shown at figure above the HAZOP 
worksheet, here are the steps: 
1. Identify the safety that related to potential hazard and 
operation problem. 
11 
 
 
 
2. Identify the safeguard that has been installed and the 
operational procedure that could be reduce the 
consequence that related to hazard potential. 
3. Determined the serious effect than the consequence 
for the problem that has to be identified. 
4. Evaluate the safeguard availability and the procedure. 
5. Safeguard recommendation if needed. 
 
12 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 HAZOP Worksheet BS IEC 61882 
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2.2.2. Risk Evaluation 
 
The risk evaluation is judgment, on the basis of risk analysis, 
of whether a risk is tolerable (ISO 17776:2000). This level of 
risk should be compared with risk criteria for determining if the 
risk is acceptable or tolerable. Evaluating risks is important for 
determining priorities for the implementation of risk control 
measures. The risk rating is a combination of the frequency (F) 
and the likelihood of the incident occurring and the severity of 
the possible consequences (C) (ISO (Intenational Organization 
for Standardization), 2009). 
On evaluate risk, there is a point which must know to determine 
criteria for the risk. This is will be a reference to know the 
criteria of the risk, tolerable, intolerable or ALARP (As Low 
As Reasonably Practicable). There for it will be need a standard 
as a reference to determine their criteria, some standard well 
most known are DNV-GL, NASA, US Coast Guard, US 
Department of Defense, UK HSE, IMO, etc. For risk evaluation 
on this Bachelor Thesis will be use Risk Matrix from Event 
Risk Screening Matrix Table by ENI HSE risk management 
Standard. 
14 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 ENI HSE Risk Matrix 
Every color has a meaning, where: 
 Continuous improvement (blue color): The level of risk is 
broadly acceptable and generic control measures are 
required aimed at avoiding deterioration. 
 Risk reduction measure (yellow color): The level of risk 
can be tolerable only once a structured review of risk 
reduction measures has been carried out (where necessary, 
the relevant guidance from the local Authorities should be 
adopted for application of ALARP). ALARP is a concept 
that applies well only to personnel risk. For environmental 
risk the concept of BPEO is more frequently applied. Asset 
risk is often most easily judged on a basis of costs and 
benefits alone. 
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 Intolerable risk (red color): The level of risk is not 
acceptable and risk control measures are required to move 
the risk figure to the previous regions. 
 
 
Figure 4 Risk to People Assessment Matrix 
From the figure above we know if the risk is on which level. 
Each level of people  effected by the hazard shows in severity 
level which level are: 
1. Slight health effect / injury 
2. Minor health effect / injury 
3. Major health effect or injury 
4. Permanent total disability of or 1 fatality (small 
exposed population) 
5. Multiple fatalities (exposed groups) 
16 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Asset Risk Matrix 
From the figure above we know if the risk is on which level. 
Each level of assets loss effected by the hazard shows in 
severity level which level are: 
1. Slight damage (no disruption to operation and 
business) 
2. Minor damage (possible short disruption of operation 
business; repair cost = 200000 US$; production 
downtime = 1 day) 
3. Local damage (the unit has been repaired replaced to 
resume operation; repair cost < 2500000 US$; 
production downtime < 1 week) 
17 
 
 
 
4. Major damage (long time/major change to resume 
operations/business; repair cost < 25000000 US$; 
production downtime < 3 months. Major inquiry for 
the damage cost) 
5. Extensive damage (total loss of operations business; 
revamping necessary to resume the process; repair 
cost > 25000000 US$; production downtime > 3 
months. Major inquiry for the damage cost) 
 
 
2.2.3. Frequency and Consequence Analysis 
 
Frequency analysis involves estimating the likelihood of 
occurrence of each failure case. There are several main 
approaches to estimating frequencies: 
 Historical accident frequency data. This uses previous 
experience of accidents. It is a simple approach, relatively 
easy to understand, but is only applicable to existing 
technology with significant experience of accidents and 
where appropriate records have been kept. 
 
 Fault tree analysis. This involves breaking down an 
accident into its component causes, including human error, 
and estimating the frequency of each component from a 
combination of generic historical data and informed 
judgment. 
 
 Event tree analysis. This is a means of showing the way an 
accident may develop from an initiating event through 
several branches to one of several possible outcomes. The 
technique is usually used to extend the initiating event 
18 
 
 
 
frequency estimated by one of the above means into a 
failure case frequency suitable for combining with the 
consequence models. 
Frequencies are simply calculated by combining accident 
experience and population exposure, typically measured in 
terms of installation-years: 
Event frequency per installation per year 
=
Number of Instalation x Years of Exposure
Number of Events
 
 
A prime source of data for frequency analysis on this Bachelor 
Thesis is the Offshore and Onshore Reliability Data (OREDA). 
 
Figure 6 Example Data Record from OREDA 2002 
Estimation of the consequences of each failure case is 
necessary to complete the analysis of the risks. The approach 
usually differs for each type of hazard. For this Bachelor 
Thesis, consequence analysis will be use ALOHA software to 
determine consequence which could be arise from all hazard.  
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2.2.4. Mitigation 
 
On the off chance that there are any unsuitable danger on the 
situation, than those danger will be investigation for 
moderation act to lessen the danger. Relief investigation 
technique for this Bachelor Thesis is Layers of Protection 
Analysis. 
Layers of assurance investigation (LOPA) is a semi-
quantitative procedure that can be utilized to recognize shields 
that meet the free security layer (IPL). The IPL is equipped for 
identifying and averting or alleviating the outcomes of 
determined, conceivably dangerous event(s, for example, a 
runaway response, loss of regulation, or a blast. An IPL is free 
of the various security layers connected with the distinguished 
possibly perilous occasion. Autonomy requires that the 
execution is not influenced by the disappointment of another 
insurance layer or by the conditions that created another 
assurance layer to fall flat. In particular, the insurance layer is 
free of the starting cause. The assurance gave by the IPL lessens 
the recognized danger by a known and indicated sum 
(Summers, 2002). 
2.3. Previous Research 
  
The Previous Research about safety assessment of 
fuel system on dual fuel engine of ship had been 
done by: 
 
1. Arfi, A. A., Pitana, T., Prastowo, H., “Analisa 
Fire Risk Assessment Pada Kapal Penumpang 
(Studi Kasis Rancangan Kapal 5000 GT Milik 
Dinas Perhubungan Darat)”, Jurnal ITS 
20 
 
 
 
Department of Marine Engineering, Institut 
Teknologi Sepuluh Nopember, pp. 1-9, 
Surabaya 
 
Ship accident caused by fire in 2011 happened 25 
times. 9 accidents contributed by passenger ship. 
Based on KNKT database the fire location where 
mostly at vehicle deck and engine room. Based on 
information above, this paper discusses about 
analysis of fire risk assessment at design of ferry 
5000GT that owned by Dinas Perhubungan Darat 
that will be build at 2012. This ship has 6 deck 
assembly, 3 vehicle decks and 2 passenger decks 
with maximum capacity until 820 passengers. The 
analysis process were done by 5 steps. Designing 
of fire and safety plan arrangement early, hazard 
identification, evacuation identification, risk 
evaluation and analysis of evaluation and solution. 
Hazard identification use preliminary hazard 
analysis method. Evacuation route evaluation were 
done by pathfinder program and effectivity of 
automatic firefighting equipment were done by 
FDS program. The result of the simulation show 
that evacuation route from fire and safety plan 
arrangement could be accepted with person density 
1,8 per /m2 and response time 50 s . Simulation of 
automatic fire extinguishers show that heat release 
rate from vehicle deck01’s fire decrease from 25 
21 
 
 
 
MW to 0,5 MW, from vehicle deck02’s fire from 
1,6 MW to 4 MW and from 1,5 MW to 0 MW at 
engine room. 
  
22 
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CHAPTER III         
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
In order to solve the problem above, that will be used data 
analysis from literatures. 
1. Background. 
Before conducting the research, first will be explained 
the background of this study. 
 
2. Study of literature. 
Study literature is step about learning an object, the 
method, and material that used in this thesis. Study 
literature are obtain from books, journals, website, etc. 
 
3. Data collection. 
This phase is to obtain information about firefighting 
system inside FPU ship. 
 
4. Fire Hazard identification. 
Identify and understand the process steps and their 
functions, requirements, and specifications that are 
within the scope of the analysis. The goal in this phase 
is to clarify the design intent or purpose of the process. 
This step leads quite naturally to the identification of 
potential failure modes. 
 
5. Identify Fire Hazard Scenario. 
Identify the potential failure mode of the process, the 
potential effect of a failure, and the potential cause of 
the potential failure mode.  
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6. Frequency Analysis, Consequence Analysis and 
Detection Analysis. 
Analysis of the data in order to determine the levels of 
frequency, consequence, and detection and calculate 
the results of risk priority number (RPN).  
 
7. Risk Evaluation. 
Evaluate the risk, knowing the risk acceptable or not 
acceptable based on risk ranking table. 
  
8. Mitigation 
If there are any intolerable risk after the risk evaluation, 
then will be do a mitigation act to minimize those risk 
by using LOPA method. 
 
9. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Make conclusions based on the results obtained and 
suggestions for further research development. 
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Figure 7 Methodology Flowchart 
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CHAPTER IV                           
DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 
4.1. Data Analysis 
 
In this data analyze we analyze the data of the ship, and data 
to process the scope of problems. 
 
4.1.1. Floating Production Unit Data  
 
Name   : Jangkrik Floating Production Unit 
Type   : FPU 
Length Overall  : 200 m 
Breadth  : 46 m 
Depth (side)  : 15 m 
Depth (center)  : 15.3 m 
Max Operating Draught : 9 m 
Min Operating Draught : 6 m 
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Figure 8 General Arrangement of Jankrik FPU 
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On the FPU there are divide into two, Topside process and 
Hull process. On the FPU there are condensate liquid process 
and gas process. On the condensate liquid process there are 
many process to purify the condensate liquid into the 
conditions that acceptable. The hydrocarbon from the well 
going to the FPU, then separate into the condensate liquid 
and gas. 
 
 
Figure 9 Flow Chart of Flow Process on Jangkrik Site 
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Figure 10 Location of Jangkrik FPU on Maps 
The FPU located in Muara Bakau working area, in Makassar 
Straits offshore Kalimantan, Indonesia, approximately 70 
kilometers from Balikpapan. 
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Figure 11 Weather Condition at Latitude -1.12 and Longitude 117.67 
(Jangkrik FPU Site) 
 
The weather for this is risk assessment is take on summer 
season (20th July 2016) located at Lat -1.12 and Lon 117.67.  
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4.1.2. Process of Condensate 
 
There are many process for condensate to meet the specific 
requirement then go to the Onshore Receiving Facilities 
(ORF). 
 
 
Figure 12 Diagram of Condensate Process  
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From the Table of process above the hydrocarbon trough ten 
process to meet the specification of the condensate then go to 
on spec condensate before go to the ORF. 
 
 Condensate collection Header P&ID 
 
LTS SYSTEM
UNIT 340
SLUG 
CATCHER
UNIT 199
HP FUEL GAS 
KO DRUM
UNIT 420
FLASH GAS COND. 
REC. PUMPS 
UNIT 360
CONDENSATE COLLECTION HEADER
CLOSED DRAIN 
PUMPS
UNIT 550
BOOSTER 
COMPRESSOR
UNIT 360
OFF-SPEC 
RE-RUN PUMPS 
UNIT 210
PI
001
H
L
TI
001
H
L
COND./COND. 
EXCHANGER010
12100HB005A/B
CONDENSATE 
DEGASSER 
012100VH004
 
  
 
BDV163
UV161A
UV161B
SDV164
161
HS
I
010
PI
HH2
HH1
LL
FF
FF
 
Figure 13 P&ID of Condensate Collection Heaser 
 
Components: 
 
UV161B : Gate Valve Normally Open 
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SDV164 : Shut Down Valve 
 
Sensors and Indicators: 
 
TI : Temperature Indicator 
PI : Pressure Indicator 
HS : Level Indicator 
 
 Condensate / Condensate Exchanger 
 
012100HB005A/B
PI
008
TI
010
HH
From LP Separator
012100VS002
012100UV162A
 
TI
004
H
L
PI
005
H
L
012100SDV003
 
012100UV162B
 
To Cond. Degasser 
012100VH004
TI
009
H
012100SDV001
 From Condensate 
Collection Header
PDI
019B
H
PDI
018B
HPDI
019A
HPDI
018A
H
FI
014
To Cond. Export 
Pumps 
012200PB001A/B/C
HS
162
I
From Condensate 
Transfer Pumps 
012200PB501A/B/C
 
012100ESDV004
To MP Separator 
012100VS001
PI
006
H
L
TI
005
H
L
FF FF
FF FFFFFF
FFFF FF FF
 
Figure 14 P&ID of Condensate / Condensate exchanger 
 
 
Components: 
 
SDV001 : Shut Down Valve 
 
Sensors and Indicators: 
 
TI : Temperature Indicator 
PI : Pressure Indicator 
PDI : Pressure Differential Indicator 
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 MP Separator 
 
FJ
PIC
013
H
L
FI
013
LIC
015
H
L
TI
017
H
L
012100VS001
LI
013
LL
LIC
011
H
L
0
1
2
1
0
0
S
D
V
0
1
2
 
CI
012100SDV011
 
FIC
012
012100FV012
012100PV013
From Cond/Cond 
Exchanger
To FG Compressor 
3rd Stage Suction 
Scrubber
To 012100LV015 at 
Condensate Heater
LY
015 <
From  012100LY033B 
at LP Separator
To 012100FV111 at 
Cond. Re-run Pumps
From Cond. Coalesc. 
Feed Pump Min. Flow
To MEG Regen. And 
Reclaiming 
(Unit 390)
LY
011
To  012100FV111 at 
Cond. Re-run Pumps
LI
016
LL
HH
To Condensate 
Coalescer Feed 
Pumps
 
012100SDV066
FJ
 
0
1
2
1
0
0
B
D
V
0
1
8
FF FF
FF
FF FF
FF
FF
FF
<
NOTE 1
NOTE 1: Low selector is added following software FAT 
mark-up
 
Figure 15 P&ID of MP Separator 
Components: 
 
VS001 : MP Separator 
SDV : Shut Down Valve 
 
Sensors and Indicators: 
 
TI : Temperature Indicator 
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 Condensate Filter Coalescer Feed Pumps 
 
 
 
Figure 16 P&ID Condensate Filter Coalescer Feed Pumps 
 
 
Components: 
 
RB : Ball Valve 
PA001 : Condensate Filter Coalescer Feed Pump 
 
Sensors and Indicators: 
 
PI : Pressure Indicator 
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 Condensate Filter 
 
 
 
Figure 17 P&ID Condensate Fillter 
 
Components: 
 
CL001 : Condensate Filter 
RB : Ball Valve (reduce bore) 
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Sensors and Indicators: 
 
PI : Pressure Indicator 
 
 
 
 Condensate Heater 
 
 
 
Figure 18 P&ID Condensate Heater 
 
Components: 
 
HA003 : Condensate Exchanger 
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LV : Ball Valve (reduce bore) 
RB : Ball Valve 
 
Sensors and Indicator: 
 
PI : Pressure Indicator 
TI : Temperature Indicator 
 
 LP Separator 
 
012100VS002
PIC
035
H
L
FJPI
032 LL
HH
LI
031 LL
HH
012100PV035
 
012100SDV034
From Cond. Heater 
012100HA003
LIT
033
To  Low Selector 012200FIC033 
at Export Cond. Line
HS
033
To  012100LV033 at 
Cond. Degasser
To 012200LV015 at Cond. 
Export Recycle Line
To  012100LIC015 at 
MP Separator
Notes:
1. Mode Selector:
    MODE 1: Direct-Auto Export from LP Separator & On-Spec Re-Run
    MODE 2: Direct-Manual, Export from LP Separator without Re-Run
    MODE 3: Indirect-Auto, Export from On-Spec Re-Run  (Condensate Stabilization Unit  OFF)
    MODE 4: Storage-Auto, Storage from LP Separator, Export from Re-Run
    MODE 5: Storage-Manual, Storage from LP Separator Only.
MODE 1, 2
MODE 4, 5
To Cond./Cond 
Exchanger
H1
L
H2
PI
031
H
L
FI
001
FJ
 
0
1
2
1
0
0
B
D
V
0
3
5
LP Flash Gas Cooler
012100HA002
FF
FF
FF
FF
Selector 
(Note 1)
Signal to 011900FIC033 Export 
Condensate Flow Control
Signal from 
011900FIC033
MODE 3, 4
LIC
033
MODE 1
TI
031FF
H
L
(0-50%)
(50-100%)
Note 2
2. Software FAT mark-up
 
 
Figure 19 P&ID LP Separator 
Components: 
 
VS002 : LP Separator 
SDV : Shut Down Valve 
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Sensors and Indicator 
 
PI : Pressure Indicator  
TI : Temperature Indicator 
 
 Condensate Degasser 
 
012100VH004
012100LV033
PI
102
H
 
012100ESDV101
 
012100UV031
 
012100UV032
 
012100BDV033LI
103
HH
LIC
102
H
L
012100FV102
FIC
102
H
L
From 012100LY033 
at LP Separator
From Cond./Cond. 
Exchanger
From Cond. 
Collection Header
PW from MP Separator/
Cond. Filter Coalesc.
To Off-spec Cond. 
Tank
To On-spec Cond. 
Tank
FIT
102
LI
104
LL
SS HP Flare KO Drum Pump
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
 
 
Figure 20 P&ID Condensate Degasser 
Components: 
 
VH004 : Condensate Degasser 
SDV : Shut Down Valve 
FV : Butterfly Valve 
UV : Ball Valve 
 
Sensors and Indicators: 
 
PI : Pressure Indicator 
LI : Level Indicator 
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 Off Spec Tanks 
 
 
 
Figure 21 P&ID Off Spec Tanks 
 
Components: 
 
TC50 : Off Spec Condensate Tanks 
SDV : Shut Down Valve 
 
Sensors and Indicators: 
 
PI : Pressure Indicator 
TI : Temperature Indicator 
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 On Spec Condensate Tanks 
 
 
 
Figure 22 P&ID On Spec Tanks 
Components: 
 
TC50 : On Spec Condensate Tanks 
SDV : Shut Down Valve 
 
Sensors and Indicators: 
 
PI : Pressure Indicator 
TI : Temperature Indicator 
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4.2. Risk Assessment 
 
There are three step of risk assessment has to be done, there 
are: 
 Risk identification is the process of determining risk that 
could potentially prevent the program to achieving the 
objectives; 
 Risk analysis is the process of analyzing the level of 
dangers to environment posed by potential risk events; 
 Risk evaluation is the process used to compare the 
estimated risk against the given risk criteria so as to 
determine the significance of the risk whether the risk is 
acceptable or tolerable. 
 
4.2.1. Risk Identification 
 
The first step of risk assessment is risk identification. Risk 
identification in this bachelor thesis is identify and understand 
all the object of the process for the assessment. The result of 
risk identification is the scenario of failure mode. All of the 
scenario of the failure mode is on HAZOP worksheet as seen 
as figure below or on the attachment. 
For the example is the risk identification of condensate process 
from condensate collection header to condensate exchanger. 
The part of the system selected for examination is the line from 
the condensate collection header with material is condensate to 
the condensate exchanger, this process has function to increase 
the temperature of the condensate to meet the requirement.  
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Figure 23 Condensate Flow from Condensate Collection Header to 
Condensate Exchanger 
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Figure 24 Condensate flow to Condensate Exchanger 
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The next step is identify the element on the process and 
determine the design intent. Then decide the Guide Word and 
Element for obtaining Deviation, as shown on the figure below. 
After obtaining Deviation, the next step is determine cause, 
consequence and protection based on the arrangement. For the 
consequence which has possibility of gas leakage or explosion 
will use ALOHA software. 
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4.2.2. Risk Analysis 
 
The second step is risk analysis. Risk analysis is analyze the 
level of frequency and consequence that maybe occurred on 
system. For example is the result of condensate process from 
condensate collection header to condensate exchanger from 
HAZOP. 
Frequency value is decided by FTA method. For basic event 
value are obtained from OREDA 2002. After obtained the 
value of Failure Rates and Probability of Failure, the value will 
be matched to the risk matrix description of probability level. 
The FTA method is start from the main event on HAZOP 
worksheet. For each cause will be given a code to simplify the 
process. For example, SDV 001fails in controlled. 
A1 CH 1.1. 
A : First level contributor (It will following alphabet for 
the next level) 
1 : First contributors (It will following numerical order 
for the next causes) 
CH : System which have to identify from HAZOP 
Worksheet (in one HAZOP code) 
1 : Failure mode’s number, based on HAZOP worksheet 
1 : Potential cause order 
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SDV-001 fails in controlled (CH 1.1.) 
A1: Fail to open on demand 
A2: Spurious Operation 
A3: Structural Deficiency 
 
The value of each event are decided based on gate type. Failure 
Probability for Basic Event will obtained from Failure Rates 
value. For example of CH 1.1. First calculate the value of each 
basic event: 
 
 A1 CH 1.1. 
P = 1- e-𝜆T 
 
P: Failure Probability 
𝜆: Failure Rate (OREDA 2002: 3.46 x 10-6) 
T: Exposure Interval (OREDA 2002: 9.3247) 
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PA1 = 1- e-(3.46 x 10^-6) x 9.3247= 3.2 x 10-5 
 A2 CH 1.1. 
P = 1- e-𝜆T 
 
P: Failure Probability 
𝜆: Failure Rate (OREDA 2002: 1.36 x 10-6) 
T: Exposure Interval (OREDA 2002: 9.3247) 
 
PA2 = 1- e-(1.36 x 10^-6) x 9.3247= 1.2 x 10-5 
 A3 CH 1.1. 
P = 1- e-𝜆T 
 
P: Failure Probability 
𝜆: Failure Rate (OREDA 2002: 0.23 x 10-6) 
T: Exposure Interval (OREDA 2002: 9.3247) 
 
PA3 = 1- e-(0.23 x 10^-6) x 9.3247= 2.1 x 10-6 
 
After finish with all basic event, then calculate the top event 
based on the gate. 
CH 1.1. = CHA1 + CHA2 + CHA3 – CHA1CHA2 – CHA1CHA3 – 
CHA2CHA3 + CHA1CHA2CHA3 
CH 1.1. = (3.2 x 10-5) + (1.2 x 10-5) + (2.1 x 10-6) – (3.2 x 10-5) 
(1.2 x 10-5) – (3.2 x 10-5)(2.1 x 10-6) – (1.2 x 10-5)(2.1 x 10-6) + 
(3.2 x 10-5)(1.2 x 10-5)(2.1 x 10-6) = 4.61 x 10-5 
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Loss of Power (CH 1.2.) 
A1: Breakdown 
A2: Fail to start on demand 
A3: Fail to Synchronize 
A4: Low output  
A5: Spurious stop 
 
After Obtaining all the value of frequency, the next step is 
determine the level of consequence. To determine the level of 
consequence will used ALOHA software and ENI Risk Matrix 
Table of Asset Risk Matrix and People Risk Matrix. 
ALOHA has function to knowing the area of an explosion or 
gas leakage based on chemical properties and environment 
condition. ALOHA result will be plotted to general 
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arrangement drawing to knowing if there are any victim on that 
area or not. The complete result from ALOHA has attached on 
Attachment. 
For example on HAZOP worksheet of Condensate process 
from condensate collection header to Condensate exchanger 
there are consequence of pipe leakage and explosion, then will 
be used ALOHA software to know the consequence. 
 
 
Figure 25 Threat Zone of Risk using ALOHA Software 
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Figure 26 Threat Zone Result on Ship General Arrangement 
54 
 
 
 
4.2.3. Risk Evaluation 
 
The third step is risk evaluation. Risk evaluation is evaluate the 
probability level and severity level of the risk. On this case, will 
be given an example from failure mode on SDV-001 fails in 
controlled. Based on risk analysis this failure mode has 
probability level on A level and severity level on 2 level. Then 
those result will be plotted on ENI Risk Matrix. 
 
Figure 27 Failure mode on SDC-001 Fails in Controlled 
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Figure 28Frequency of SDV-001 Fails in Controlled 
 
Figure 29 Probability and Severity Level at People Risk Matrix 
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Figure 30 Probability and Severity Level on Asset Risk Matrix 
 
From the figure above, there are a different value of severity 
level at People Risk Matrix and Asset Risk Matrix. From that 
different value we have to choose the higher value of severity 
because it present the worst effect of the severity value. The 
result will be on the figure below. 
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Figure 31 Result of the Failure on SDV-001 Fails in Controlled 
Every color has a meaning, where: 
 Continuous improvement (blue color): The level of risk is 
broadly acceptable and generic control measures are 
required aimed at avoiding deterioration. 
 Risk reduction measure (yellow color): The level of risk 
can be tolerable only once a structured review of risk 
reduction measures has been carried out (where necessary, 
the relevant guidance from the local Authorities should be 
adopted for application of ALARP). ALARP is a concept 
that applies well only to personnel risk. For environmental 
risk the concept of BPEO is more frequently applied. Asset 
risk is often most easily judged on a basis of costs and 
benefits alone. 
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 Intolerable risk (red color): The level of risk is not 
acceptable and risk control measures are required to move 
the risk figure to the previous regions. 
 
The result from risk matrix shown that the Failure on SDV-001 
fails in controlled has a level of risk on continuous 
improvement (blue color) level. That is mean these is 
acceptable. If there is unacceptable risk, the risk must reduce, 
and the mitigation using LOPA method. 
This figure below is the example worksheet of condensate 
process from condensate collection header to condensate 
exchanger. The other evaluation will be attached on 
Attachment. 
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4.3.   Mitigation 
 
After all the risk assessment step, the last step is mitigation. 
Mitigation is a step to reduce or prevent the unacceptable risk 
to be happened. Mitigation in this thesis will be used in risk 
reduction measure level and intolerable risk level. 
This Mitigation on this thesis will be using LOPA method. 
LOPA method using the scenario of risk on HAZOP worksheet. 
LOPA method will be reducing the probability of the event risk 
that occurred so the level on the risk matrix will be reduce too. 
The first step on LOPA method is determine the scenario and 
the probability value that exist on the HAZOP worksheet. Next 
step is, list all the equipment for the detection of the failure that 
has been apply on the process system. The equipment is the IPL 
on the LOPA method. On the IPL of LOPA method there will 
be PFD value. The PFD value of IPL we can get it from 
OREDA. 
The example of LOPA method will be shown in this figure 
below. This example of LOPA method is from failure mode 
“no condensate flow on pipeline from condensate exchanger to 
MP separator” scenario. 
 
 
62 
 
 
 
 
Figure 32 Result of LOPA Method 
From the picture above we know that the probability of failure 
mode on “no condensate flow on pipeline from condensate 
exchanger to MP separator” decrease from 7.4 x 10-5 to 2.72 x 
10-15.  
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Figure 33 Risk Matrix result before the mitigation using LOPA method 
From the picture above we know that the risk matrix before 
the mitigation using LOPA method. It shows that the result is 
on the Risk reduction measure level (yellow color), so the 
failure mode must be reduce to the continuous improvement 
level (blue color). 
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Figure 34 Risk Matrix level after the mitigation using LOPA 
From the picture above we know that the risk matrix after 
the mitigation using LOPA method. It shows that the result is 
on continuous improvement level (blue color), because the 
probability value is 2.72 x 10-15 and fall in the 0 level of 
probability. 
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ATTACHMENT I 
 
1. General Arrangement Jangkrik FPU 
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ATTACHMENT II 
 
1. HAZOP Analysis and risk evaluation result 
2. Frequency analysis using FTA 
3. Consequence analysis using ALOHA 
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FTA FREQUENCY ANALYSIS 
 
 
SDV-001 fails in controlled (CH 1.1.) 
A1: Fail to open on demand 
A2: Spurious Operation 
A3: Structural Deficiency 
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Loss of Power (CH 1.2.) 
A1: Breakdown 
A2: Fail to start on demand 
A3: Fail to Synchronize 
A4: Low output 
A5: Spurious stop 
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SDV-066 fails in controlled (MPS 1.1.) 
A1: Fail to open on demand 
A2: Spurious operation 
A3: Structural deficiency 
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Failure on flow system before condensate filter coalescer feed 
pumps (MPS 1.2.) 
A1: Line 1 flow 
A2: Line 2 flow 
A3: Line 3 flow 
B1: Fail to open on demand (ball valve) 
B2: Fail on pump 
B3: Failure on pipe (leakage) 
B4: Fail to open on demand (ball valve) 
B5: Fail on pump 
B6: Failure on pipe (leakage) 
B7: Fail to open on demand (ball valve) 
B8: Fail on pump 
B9: Failure on pipe (leakage) 
C1: Loss of power 
C2: Breakdown 
C3: Loss of power 
C4: Breakdown 
C5: Loss of power 
C6: Breakdown 
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C1: Loss of power (line 1) 
D1: Breakdown 
D2: Fail to start 
D3: Fail to synchronize 
D4: Low output 
D5: Spurious stop 
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C1: Loss of power (line 2) 
D1: Breakdown 
D2: Fail to start 
D3: Fail to synchronize 
D4: Low output 
D5: Spurious stop 
 
 
 
 
 
 
83 
 
 
 
 
C1: Loss of power (line 3) 
D1: Breakdown 
D2: Fail to start 
D3: Fail to synchronize 
D4: Low output 
D5: Spurious stop 
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Loss of power (MPS 1.3.) 
D1: Breakdown 
D2: Fail to start 
D3: Fail to synchronize 
D4: Low output 
D5: Spurious stop 
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Failure on flow system after condensate filter coalescer feed 
pumps (CFP 1.1.) 
A1: Ball valve failure 
A2: Pipeline leakage 
B1: Line 1 flow 
B2: Line 2 flow 
B3: Line 3 flow 
C1: Fail to open on demand 
C2: Spurious stop 
C3: Structural deficiency 
C4: Fail to open on demand 
C5: Spurious stop 
C6: Structural deficiency 
C7: Fail to open on demand 
C8: Spurious stop 
C9: Structural deficiency 
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Failure on flow system before condensate filter (CFP1.2.) 
A1: Line 1 flow 
A2: Line 2 flow 
B1: Fail to open on demand 
B2: Spurious stop 
B3: Structural deficiency 
B4: Fail to open on demand 
B5: Spurious stop 
B6: Structural deficiency 
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Failure on flow system after condensate filter (CF 1.1.) 
A1:Pipeline leakage 
A2: Failure on ball valve 
B1: Fail to open on demand 
B2: Spurious stop 
B3: Structural deficiency 
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Failure on flow system before condensate heater (CF 1.2.) 
A1: Fail to open on demand 
A2: Spurious stop 
A3: Structural deficiency 
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Failure on flow system before condensate degasser (CE 1.1.) 
A1: Pipeline leakage 
A2: Failure on globe valve 
B1: Fail to open 
B2: Spurious operation 
B3: Structural deficiency 
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Failure on flow system degasser condensate degasser (CDF 
1.1.) 
A1: Pipeline leakage 
A2: Failure on pipeline 
B1: Failure on butterfly valve 
B2: Failure on ball valve 
C1: Fail to regulate 
C2: Leakage 
C3: Fail to open on demand 
C4: Spurious operation 
C5: Structural deficiency 
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Failure on flow system degasser condensate degasser (CDO 
1.1.) 
A1: Pipeline leakage 
A2: Failure on pipeline 
B1: Failure on butterfly valve 
B2: Failure on ball valve 
C1: Fail to regulate 
C2: Leakage 
C3: Fail to open on demand 
C4: Spurious operation 
C5: Structural deficiency 
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Failure on flow system from on spec condensate tank to ORF 
(CDO 2.1.) 
A1: Fail to open on demand 
A2: Spurious operation 
A3: Structural deficiency 
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 HAZOP ANALYSIS AND RISK EVALUATION RESULT 
STUDY TITLE: Condensate process from condensate collection header to condensate exchanger SHEET: 1 of 2 
Drawing No.: 11401 REV. No.: DATE: 17 - 06 - 2016 
PART CONSIDERED: Preheat the unstabilize condensate 
DESIGN INTENT: Normal 
pressure 25.1 (bar) 
Material: Condensate Activity: pre heated in condensate exchanger 
Source: condensate collection header Destination: condensate exchanger 
No. 
Guide 
Word 
Element Deviation 
Possible 
Causes 
Probability 
Failure 
Probability 
Level 
Consequences 
Severity 
Level 
Safeguards Risk Level 
Action 
Required 
1 NO Condensate 
no 
condensate 
transfer to 
condensate 
exchanger 
SDV-001 
fails in 
controlled 
4.61 x 10-5 A 
no 
condensate 
flow on 
condensate 
exchanger will 
be delayed 
the process 
2 
TI 004; PI 
005 
Continous 
Improvement 
  
Loss of 
power 
8.031 x 10-
3 
B 
no 
condensate 
flow on 
condensate 
exchanger will 
be delayed 
the process 
2 
TI 004; PI 
005 
Continous 
Improvement 
  
2 LESS Condensate 
Less 
condensate 
transfer to 
condensate 
exchanger 
Pipeline 
leakage 
from 
condensate 
collection 
header 
trough 
7.4 x 10-6 0 
no 
condensate 
flow on 
condensate 
exchanger will 
be delayed 
the process 
3 
TI 004; PI 
005 
Continous 
Improvement 
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condensate 
exchanger 
 
STUDY TITLE: Condensate process from condensate collection header to condensate exchanger SHEET: 2 of 2 
Drawing No.: 11401 REV. No.: DATE: 17 - 06 - 2016 
PART CONSIDERED: Preheat the unstabilize condensate 
DESIGN INTENT: Normal 
pressure 25.1 (bar) 
Material: Condensate Activity: pre heated in condensate exchanger 
Source: condensate collection header Destination: condensare exchanger 
No. 
Guide 
Word 
Element Deviation 
Possible 
Causes 
Probability 
Failure 
Probability 
Level 
Consequences 
Severity 
Level 
Safeguards Risk Level 
Action 
Required 
3 MORE Condensate 
More 
condensate 
transfer to 
condensate 
exchanger 
SDV-001 
fails in 
closed 
position 
5.4 x 10-5 A 
Excessive 
pressure on 
condensate 
exchanger 
pipeline 
2 
TI 004; PI 
005 
Continous 
Improvement 
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STUDY TITLE: Condensate process from condensate exchanger to MP separator SHEET: 1 of 1 
Drawing No.: 11402 REV. No.: DATE: 17 - -06 - 2016 
PART CONSIDERED: Separated gas and water from the incoming condensate 
DESIGN INTENT: Min. 13.1; 
Max. 16.5 (pressure, bar) 
Material: condensate Activity: separated gas and water from condensate 
Source: condensate exchanger Destination: MP separator 
No
. 
Guid
e 
Word 
Element Deviation 
Possible 
Causes 
Probabilit
y Failure 
Probabilit
y Level 
Consequence
s 
Severit
y Level 
Safeguards  Risk Level 
Action 
Required 
1 NO Condensate 
No 
condensat
e flow on 
pipeline 
Pipeline 
leakage 
7.4 x 10-5 A 
No 
condensate 
flow to MP 
separator 
4 TI 009; PI 008 Risk  
Reduction 
measure 
Yes 
2 LESS Condensate 
Less 
condensat
e flow on 
pipeline 
Pipeline 
leakage 
7.4 x 10-6 0 
Excessive 
pressure on 
condensate 
exchanger 
pipeline 
4 TI 009; PI 008 
Continous 
Improvemen
t 
Yes 
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STUDY TITLE: Condensate process from MP separator to condensate filter coalescer feed pumps SHEET: 1 of 2 
Drawing No.: 11403 REV. No.: DATE: 17 - 06 - 2016 
PART CONSIDERED: Prefilter and pressurize the condensate 
DESIGN INTENT: Suct.13.3; 
Diff. 2.5 (pressure, bar) 
Material: condensate Activity: transfer and pre-filter condensate 
Source: MP separator Destination: condensate filter coalescer feed pump 
No. 
Guide 
Word 
Element Deviation 
Possible 
Causes 
Probability 
Failure 
Probability 
Level 
Consequences 
Severity 
Level 
Safeguards Risk Level 
Action 
Required 
NO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Condensate 
no 
condensate 
transfer to 
condensate 
exchanger 
SDV-066 
fails in 
controlled 
4.51 x 10-5 A 
no 
condensate 
flow on 
condensate 
filter 
coalescer 
feed pump 
will be 
delayed the 
process 
2 PI 053 
Continous 
Improvement 
  
Failure on 
flow system 
before 
condensate 
filter 
coalescer 
feed pumps 
4.91 x 10-6 A 
no 
condensate 
flow on 
condensate 
filter 
coalescer 
feed pump 
will be 
delayed the 
process 
3 PI 053 
Continous 
Improvement 
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Loss of 
power 
8.031 x 10-
3 
B 
no 
condensate 
flow on 
condensate 
filter 
coalescer 
feed pumps 
will be 
delayed the 
process 
2 
  
Continous 
Improvement 
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STUDY TITLE: Condensate process from MP separator to condensate filter coalescer feed pumps 2 of 2 
Drawing No.: 11403 REV. No.: DATE: 17 - 06 - 2016 
PART CONSIDERED: Prefilter and pressurize the condensate 
DESIGN INTENT: Suct.13.3; 
Diff. 2.5 (pressure, bar) 
Material: condensate Activity: transfer and pre-filter condensate 
Source: MP separator Destination: condensate filter coalescer feed pump 
No. 
Guide 
Word 
Element Deviation 
Possible 
Causes 
Probability 
Failure 
Probability 
Level 
Consequences 
Severity 
Level 
Safeguards Risk Level 
Action 
Required 
2 LESS Condensate 
Less 
condensate 
transfer to 
condensate 
filter 
coalescer 
feed 
pumps 
Pipeline 
leakage from 
MP 
separator 
trough 
condensate 
filter 
coalescer 
feed pump 
7.4 x 10-6 A 
Excessive 
pressure on 
condensate 
filter 
coalescer 
feed pumps 
3 PI 053 
Continous 
Improvement 
  
3 MORE Condensate 
More 
condensate 
transfer to 
condensate 
filter 
coalescer 
feed 
pumps 
SDV-066 
fails in 
closed 
position 
5`4 x 10-5 A 
Excessive 
pressure on 
condensate 
filter 
coalescer 
feed pumps 
3 PI 053 
Continous 
Improvement 
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STUDY TITLE: Condensate process from condensate filter coalescer feed pumps to condensate filter SHEET: 1 of 1 
Drawing No.: 11411 REV. No.: DATE: 17 - 06 - 2016 
PART CONSIDERED: Separate water from condensate 
DESIGN INTENT: Min. 17; 
Max. 22 (pressure, bar) 
Material: condensate Activity: filter water from condensate 
Source: condensate filter coalescer pump Destination: condensate filter 
No. 
Guide 
Word 
Element Deviation 
Possible 
Causes 
Probability 
Failure 
Probability 
Level 
Consequences 
Severity 
Level 
Safeguards Risk Level 
Action 
Required 
1 NO Condensate 
No 
condensate 
transfer to 
condensate 
filter 
Failure on 
flow system 
after 
condensate 
filter 
coalescer 
feed pumps 
7.4 x 10-5 A 
no 
condensate 
flow on 
condensate 
filter will be 
delayed the 
process 
4 PI 060 
Continous 
Improvement 
  
Failure on 
flow system 
before 
condensate 
filter  
3.07 x 10-9 0 
no 
condensate 
flow on 
condensate 
filter will be 
delayed the 
process 
4 PI 060 
Continous 
Improvement 
  
2 LESS Condensate 
Less 
condensate 
transfer to 
condensate 
filter 
Pipeline 
leakage 
7.4 x 10-6 A 
Less 
condensate 
flow on 
condensate 
filter will be 
delayed the 
process 
4 PI 060 
Continous 
Improvement 
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STUDY TITLE: Condensate process from  condensate filter to condensate heater SHEET: 1 of 2 
Drawing No.: 11412 REV. No.: DATE: 17 - 06 - 2016 
PART CONSIDERED: Heated in the condensate 
DESIGN INTENT: Min. 1.5; 
Max.19.6 (pressure, bar) 
Material: condensate Activity: heating the condensate 
Source: condensate filter Destination: condensate heater 
No. 
Guide 
Word 
Element Deviation 
Possible 
Causes 
Probability 
Failure 
Probabilit
y Level 
Consequence
s 
Severit
y Level 
Safeguards Risk Level 
Action 
Require
d 
1 NO Condensate 
No 
condensate 
transfer to 
condensate 
heater 
Failure on 
flow system 
after 
condensate 
filter 
1.2 x 10-4 B 
no 
condensate 
flow on 
condensate 
heater will be 
delayed the 
process 
2 
PI 029; TI 
029 
Continous 
Improvement 
  
Failure on 
flow system 
before 
condensate 
heater 
4.61 x 10-5 A 
no 
condensate 
flow on 
condensate 
heater will be 
delayed the 
process 
3 
PI 029; TI 
029 
Continous 
Improvement 
  
2 LESS Condensate 
Less 
condensate 
flow 
Pipeline 
leakage 
before 
condensate 
heater 
7.4 x 10-6 A 
no 
condensate 
flow on 
condensate 
heater will be 
delayed the 
process 
3 
PI 029; TI 
029 
Continous 
Improvement 
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STUDY TITLE: Condensate process from  condensate filter to condensate heater SHEET: 2 of 2 
Drawing No.: 11412 REV. No.: DATE: `7 - 06 - 2016 
PART CONSIDERED: Heated in the condensate 
DESIGN INTENT: Min. 1.5; 
Max.19.6 (pressure, bar) 
Material: condensate Activity: heating the condensate 
Source: condensate filter Destination: condensate heater 
No
. 
Guide 
Word 
Element Deviation 
Possible 
Causes 
Probabilit
y Failure 
Probabilit
y Level 
Consequenc
es 
Severit
y Level 
Safeguards Risk Level 
Action 
Required 
2 LESS 
Condansate 
(temperatur
e) 
Less 
condensate 
temperatur
e 
Condensate 
exhanger 
damaged 
9.9 x 10-6 0 
Condensate 
exchanger 
not meet the 
temperature 
requirement 
1 
PI 029; TI 
029 
Continous 
Improveme
nt 
  
3 
MOR
E 
Condensate 
(temperatur
e) 
More 
condensate 
temperatur
e 
Condensate 
exhanger 
damaged 
9.9x10-6 0 
Condensate 
exchanger 
not meet the 
temperature 
requirement 
1 
PI 029; TI 
029 
Continous 
Improveme
nt 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
108 
 
 
 
STUDY TITLE: Condensate process from  condensate heater to LP separator SHEET: 1 of 1 
Drawing No.: 11422 REV. No.: DATE: 17 - 06 - 2016 
PART CONSIDERED: For fonal Stabilization 
DESIGN INTENT: Min. 1; 
Max. 5 (pressure, bar) 
Material: condensate Activity:  final stabilization 
Source: condensate heater Destination: LP separator 
No
. 
Guid
e 
Word 
Element Deviation 
Possible 
Causes 
Probabilit
y Failure 
Probabilit
y Level 
Consequence
s 
Severit
y Level 
Safeguards Risk Level 
Action 
Required 
1 NO Condensate 
No 
condensat
e flow 
Pipeline 
leakage 
7.4 x 10-5 A 
no 
condensate 
flow on 
condensate 
heater will be 
delayed the 
process 
2 PI 024; TI 024 
Continous 
Improvemen
t 
  
2 LESS Condensate 
Less 
condensat
e flow 
Pipeline 
leakage 
7.4 x 10-6 0 
no 
condensate 
flow on 
condensate 
heater will be 
delayed the 
process 
2 PI 024; TI 024 
Continous 
Improvemen
t 
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STUDY TITLE: Condensate process from LP separator to condensate exchanger SHEET: 1 of 1 
Drawing No.: 11423 REV. No.: DATE: 17 - 06 - 2016 
PART CONSIDERED: Preheated the condensate 
DESIGN INTENT: Normal 
pressure 25.1 (bar) 
Material: condensate Activity: preheate condensate 
Source: LP separator Destination: condensate exchanger 
No. 
Guide 
Word 
Element Deviation 
Possible 
Causes 
Probability 
Failure 
Probability 
Level 
Consequences 
Severity 
Level 
Safeguards Risk Level 
Action 
Required 
1 NO Condensate 
No 
condensate 
transfer to 
condensate 
exchanger 
Failure on 
flow system 
before 
condensate 
exchanger 
7.4 x 10-5 A 
no 
condensate 
flow on 
condensate 
exchanger will 
be delayed 
the process 
3   
Continous 
Improvement 
  
2 LESS Condensate 
Less 
condensate 
flow 
Pipeline 
leakage 
7.4 x 10-6 0 
low 
condensate 
flow on 
condensate 
exchanger will 
be delayed 
the process 
3 
  
Continous 
Improvement 
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STUDY TITLE: Condensate process from condensate exchanger to condensate degasser SHEET: 1 of 1 
Drawing No.: 11402 REV. No.: DATE: 17 - 06 - 2016 
PART CONSIDERED: To remove gasses from cpndensate which could otherwise form bubbles 
DESIGN INTENT: Min. 0.5; 
Max. 3.5 (pressure, bar) 
Material: condensate Activity: to remove gasses from condensate 
Source: condensate exchanger Destination: condensate degasser 
No. 
Guide 
Word 
Element Deviation 
Possible 
Causes 
Probability 
Failure 
Probability 
Level 
Consequences 
Severity 
Level 
Safeguards Risk Level 
Action 
Required 
1 NO Condensate 
No 
condensate 
transfer to 
condensate 
degasser 
Failure on 
flow system 
before 
condensate 
degasser 
9.7 x 10-5 A 
no 
condensate 
flow on 
condensate 
heater will be 
delayed the 
process 
2 
  
Continous 
Improvement 
  
2 LESS condensate 
Less 
condensate 
transfer to 
condensate 
degasser 
Pipeline 
leakage 
7.4 x 10-6 0 
low 
condensate 
flow on 
condensate 
degasser will 
be delayed 
the process 
3 
  
Continous 
Improvement 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
111 
 
 
 
STUDY TITLE: Condensate process from condensate degasser to off spec condensate tanks SHEET: 1 of 1 
Drawing No.: 60108 REV. No.: DATE: 17 - 06 - 2016 
PART CONSIDERED: Transfer the condensate 
DESIGN INTENT: Min. 
0.05; Max. 12 (pressure, 
bar) 
Material: condensate Activity: transfer the condensate to off spec  tank 
Source: condensate degasser Destination: off spec condensate tanks 
No. 
Guide 
Word 
Element Deviation 
Possible 
Causes 
Probability 
Failure 
Probability 
Level 
Consequences 
Severity 
Level 
Safeguards Risk Level 
Action 
Required 
1 NO Condensate 
No 
condensate 
transfer to 
off spec 
tanks 
Failure on 
flow 
system 
degasser 
condensate 
degasser 
1.21 x 10-4 B 
no 
condensate 
flow on 
condensate 
Off spec tanks 
will be 
delayed the 
process 
2 
TI 511; PI 
522; LI 511 
(Tank 
Monitoring)  
Continous 
Improvement 
  
2 LESS Condensate 
Less 
Condensate 
transfer 
Pipeline 
leakage 
7.4 x 10-6 0 
Low 
condensate 
flow on 
condensate 
Off spec tanks 
will be 
delayed the 
process 
3 
TI 511; PI 
522; LI 511 
(Tank 
Monitoring)  
Continous 
Improvement 
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STUDY TITLE: Condensate process from condensate degasser to on spec condensate tanks SHEET: 1 of 1 
Drawing No.: 60109 REV. No.: DATE: 17 - 06 -2016 
PART CONSIDERED: Transfer the condensate 
DESIGN INTENT: Min. 
0.05; Max. 12 (pressure, 
bar) 
Material: condensate Activity: transfer the condensate to on spec  tank 
Source: condensate degasser Destination: on spec condensate tanks 
No. Guide 
Word 
Element Deviation 
Possible 
Causes 
Probability 
Failure 
Probability 
Level 
Consequences 
Severity 
People 
Safeguards Risk Level 
Action 
Required 
1 NO Condensate 
No 
condensate 
transfer to 
off spec 
tanks 
Failure on 
flow 
system 
degasser 
condensate 
degasser 
1.21 x 10-4 B 
no 
condensate 
flow on 
condensate 
Off spec tanks 
will be 
delayed the 
process 
2 
TI 531; PI 
524; LI 531 
(Tank 
Monitoring)  
Continous 
Improvement 
  
2 LESS Condensate 
Less 
Condensate 
transfer 
Pipeline 
leakage 
7.4 x 10-6 0 
Low 
condensate 
flow on 
condensate 
Off spec tanks 
will be 
delayed the 
process 
3 
TI 531; PI 
524; LI 531 
(Tank 
Monitoring)  
Continous 
Improvement 
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CONSEQUNECE ANALYSIS 
USING ALOHA 
 
1. Condensate process from condensate collection 
header to condensate exchanger 
 
 
2. Condensate process from condensate exchanger to 
MP separator 
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3. Condensate process from MP separator to condensate 
filter coalescer feed pumps 
 
 
4. Condensate process from condensate filter coalescer 
feed pumps to condensate filter 
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5. Condensate process from  condensate filter to 
condensate heater 
 
 
6. Condensate process from  condensate heater to LP 
separator 
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7. Condensate process from LP separator to condensate 
exchanger 
 
 
8. Condensate process from condensate exchanger to 
condensate degasser 
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9. Condensate process from condensate degasser to off 
spec condensate tanks 
 
10. Condensate process from condensate degasser to off 
spec condensate tanks 
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MITIGATION 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the result of the fire risk assessment of the FPU 
Jangkrik, we can conclude that: 
1. There is one high risk inside the Floating Production 
Unit that is Condensate system inside the FPU. 
2. Every system on the FPU that passed by Condensate 
will at the higher risk of fire, because the condensate 
its dangerous chemical fluid that has higher flash point. 
3. There are many potential of fire caused by condensate 
flow. Every system is used to process the condensate 
until meet the specification will be a potential hazard 
in FPU. 
4. There are many potential hazard on the condensate 
process inside the FPU such as Condensate process 
from condensate collection header to condensate 
exchanger, Condensate process from condensate 
exchanger to MP separator, Condensate process from 
MP separator to condensate filter coalescer feed 
pumps, Condensate process from condensate filter 
coalescer feed pumps to condensate filter, Condensate 
process from  condensate filter to condensate heater, 
Condensate process from  condensate heater to LP 
separator, Condensate process from LP separator to 
condensate exchanger, Condensate process from 
condensate exchanger to condensate degasser, 
Condensate process from condensate degasser to off 
spec condensate tanks, and Condensate process from 
condensate degasser to on spec condensate tanks. 
5. There are many failure mode on every system process 
of condensate process. 
68 
 
 
 
6. Most result of risk matrix on every failure mode shows 
on the continuous improvement level (blue color). 
7. There is one risk that unacceptable, the risk is when the 
pipe from the condensate exchanger to the MP 
separator leakage it can cause the major destruction of 
the FPU but there is no casualties, but on the risk 
matrix it shows that the failure mode on risk reduction 
measure level (yellow level). 
8. After the mitigation using LOPA the risk that 
unacceptable turn to continuous improvement level 
(blue color), so the hazard can be tolerable. 
9. The mitigation by add pressure indicator and 
temperature indicator to the system. 
10. All of the other risk that can cause hazard and make a 
local loss but all of it is acceptable. 
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